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Abstract
Background: During the April-July 2009 outbreak of H1N1/2009 in scotland the West of Scotland Specialist
Virology Centre (WoSSVC) in Glasgow tested > 16 000 clinical samples for H1N1/2009. Most were from patients
clinically diagnosed with H1N1/2009. Out of these, 9% were positive. This study sought to determine what
respiratory pathogens were misdiagnosed as cases of H1N1/2009 during this time.
Methods: We examined the results from 3247 samples which were sent to the laboratory during April-July 2009.
All were from patients clinically diagnosed as having H1N1/2009 (based on accepted criteria) and all were given a
full respiratory screen using real time reverse transcriptase polymerase chain reaction (rtRT-PCR) assays.
Results: In total, respiratory pathogens were detected in 27.9% (95% confidence interval, 26.3-29.5%) of the
samples submitted. Numerous pathogens were detected, the most common of which were rhinovirus (8.9% (95%
confidence interval, 7.9-9.9%)), parainfluenza 1 (1.9% (95% confidence interval, 1.4-2.4%)) and 3 (4.1% (95%
confidence interval, 3.3-4.9%)), and adenovirus ((3.5% (95% confidence interval, 2.9-4.2%)).
Conclusions: This study highlights the problems of using a clinical algorithm to detect H1N1/2009. Clinicians
frequently misdiagnosed common respiratory pathogens as H1N1/2009 during the spring/summer outbreak in
Scotland. Many undesirable consequences would have resulted, relating to treatment, infection control, and public
health surveillance.
Background
On April 15
th and 17
th 2009, a novel swine-lineage
influenza A (H1N1/2009) infection was reported to the
World Health Organisation (WHO) by the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in Atlanta. The
virus was detected in two children from adjacent coun-
ties in southern California presenting with febrile
respiratory illness [1,2]. These cases were not epidemio-
logically linked and neither child had exposure to swine.
Subsequent phylogenetic characterisation of H1N1/2009
from the U.S. index case (A/California/04/2009) showed
that the virus had a unique genome composition that
had not been previously identified. Six genes (PB2, PB1,
PA, HA, NP, and NS) were similar to viruses previously
identified in triple-reassortant swine influenza viruses in
North American pigs. The remaining two genes (NA
and M) were derived from Eurasian swine influenza
viruses. This particular gene constellation had never
been previously identified in humans or other reservoirs.
Following the original identification of Influenza A/
H1N1/2009 in the United States, sustained human-to-
human transmission was seen in other countries, and on
June 11, 2009, the WHO declared that the virus was
r e s p o n s i b l ef o rt h ef i r s ti n f l u e n z ap a n d e m i co ft h e2 1 s t
century [3].
The first cases of H1N1/2009 in Scotland were
detected at the end of April 2009 in a couple returning
from their honeymoon in Mexico [4,5]. The initial pub-
lic health response to the outbreak was a containment
exercise aimed at preventing the spread of infection,
detecting cases and taking action to prevent these cases
from infecting others [6]. The exercise was initially
based on clinical and epidemiological criteria (table 1).
Patients who met these criteria were immediately given
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transcriptase polymerase chain reaction (rtRT-PCR) for
H1N1/2009 was initiated. Contact tracing was underta-
ken in order to treat those who had been in contact
with confirmed cases. Soon after the first detections,
person to person transmission was confirmed as having
occurred in Scotland. Consequently, the epidemiological
criteria were no longer useful and the containment exer-
cise was then based on clinical criteria only. Testing
continued to be carried out during this period.
During the outbreak period (April-July 2009) the West
of Scotland Specialist Virology Centre (WoSSVC) tested
16 264 clinical samples for H1N1/2009 (Figure 1). Of
these, only 1516 were positive (9% overall for the period
of April-July; range 5-10% per month). Consequently,
the clinical diagnosis was found to be wrong in the
majority of cases.
A large number of viral infections, drugs and other
diseases can cause disease presentations similar to those
presented in Table 1. This is especially true for respira-
tory pathogens. The present study sought to determine
what respiratory pathogens were diagnosed as cases of
H1N1/2009 during the containment phase.
Methods
Background to the respiratory service in place during
April-July 2009
During April-July 2009 all respiratory samples submitted
from patients with a clinical diagnosis of H1N1/2009 (as
stated on the specimen request form), were initially tested
using a universal influenza A real time rtRT-PCR assay
and a H1N1/2009 specific real time rtRT-PCR assay [7].
If the sample was negative on these tests and was
from a hospitalised patient, a patient deemed at risk of
severe respiratory infection (e.g. an immunocompro-
mised or a pregnant patient), or a patient attending GP
services taking part in local or national surveillance
schemes, a full respiratory screen was carried out (see
below for details regarding the full respiratory screen).
Note that this information was derived from the sample
request form.
With regard to (i) samples from GP services not taking
part in the surveillance schemes mentioned above, (ii) fol-
low-up samples from known H1N1/2009 positive patients,
and (iii) samples from patients with no clinical/setting
details, only the initial screening test was conducted.
Samples
To determine which respiratory pathogens had been
misdiagnosed as H1N1/2009, we examined the results of
3247 samples which had been given a full respiratory
screen during the period April-July 2009.
All had been clinically diagnosed as having H1N1/2009,
and all were found to be H1N1/2009 negative. The sam-
ples submitted included gargles, throat swabs, nasal swabs,
nasopharyngeal aspirates, sputums, and endotracheal
secretions. The number collected each month and the age
of the patients are shown in Table 2. Binomial 95% confi-
dence intervals are shown for each age group.
Laboratory Methods
Total nucleic acid was extracted from respiratory speci-
mens using QIAamp Viral RNA kit (Qiagen, Crawley,
United Kingdom) according to the manufacturer’s
instructions.
Real-time RT-PCR was carried out in order to detect
influenza A (a generic assay and a H1N1/2009 specific
assay [7]), B and C, RSV, rhinovirus, parainfluenza 1-4,
human metapneumovirus, coronavirus (229E, NL63,
HKU1 and OC43), adenovirus, and Mycoplasma
pneumoniae.
The oligonucleotide primers and probe (TIB-MOL-
BIOL, Berlin, Germany) are outlined in Table 3. The pri-
mers and probes for the influenza A generic assay and
the H1N1/2009 specific assay are described elsewhere
[7]. These assays have been developed by the WOSSVC
and used as the frontline test for respiratory samples
since 2005. All assays have been shown to be sensitive
and specific by in-house development procedures and via
participation in numerous external quality assessment
schemes (EQA), including those provided by the WHO,
the Health Protection Agency (HPA), and Quality Con-
trols for Molecular Diagnostics (QCMD).
Table 1 The clinical and epidemiological criteria for the
screening and testing of H1N1/2009 cases
Clinical Criteria Epidemiological criteria
Fever or history of fever and flu-
like illness or severe life
threatening illness suggestive of
an infectious process
Onset of illness within 7 days of
travelling to an area where
sustained transmission of
H1N1/2009 is occurring
Contacts with a probable/
confirmed case of H1N1/2009
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Figure 1 H1N1 outbreak in the spring/summer 2009.
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Page 2 of 7Table 2 Patient groups per month of the 3247 samples
April May June July Total
Number % (95% confidence
interval)
Number %(95% confidence
interval)
Number % (95% confidence
interval)
Number % (95% confidence
interval)
Number % (95% confidence
interval)
< 1 yrs 101 16.7 (13.8-19.9%) 78 12.1 (9.7-14.8%) 91 11.8 (9.6-14.2%) 124 10.1 (8.5-11.9%) 394 12.1 (11-13.3%)
1-5 yrs 104 17.2 (14.2-20.4%) 95 14.7 (12-17.7%) 129 16.7 (14-19.5%) 143 11.7 (9.9-13.6%) 471 14.5 (13.3-15.7%)
6-16
yrs
49 8.1 (6-10.6%) 50 7.7 (5.8-10.1%) 90 11.6 (9.5-14.1%) 113 9.2 (7.7-11%) 302 9.3 (8.3-10.4%)
17-64
yrs
266 44 (40-48%) 315 48.7 (44.7-52.6
%)
378 48.8 (45-52.4%) 693 56.5 (53.7-59%) 1652 50.9 (49.1-52.6%)
>6 5
yrs
84 13.9 (11.2-16.4%) 109 16.8 (14-20%) 87 11.2 (9.1-13.7%) 148 12.1 (10.3-14%) 428 13.2 (12-14.4%)
Total 605 647 774 1226 3247
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7Table 3 Primer and probe sequences for the respiratory multiplex rtPCR
Multiplex Virus Target Target Gene Forward primer sequence Reverse primer sequence Probe sequence
1 Influenza B NS ATGATCTTACAGTGGAGGATGAAGAA CGAATTGGCTTTGRATGTCCTT CY5-ATGGCCATCGGATCCTCAAYTCACTCT-BHQ
Influenza C Matrix GGCAAGCGACATGCTGAAYA TCCAGCTGCYTTCATTTGCTTT VIC-CTCTTCCTTCTGATTTTTTCAAA-MGBNFQ
2 Mycoplasma
pneumoniae
Cytadhesin P1 (P1)
gene
AAGCAGGAGTGACGGAAACAC CACCACATCATTCCCCGTATT CY5-CTCCACCAACAACCTCGCGCCTA-BHQ
Human
metapneumovirus A
Fusion GCYGTYAGCTTCAGTCAATTCAA TCCAGCATTGTCTGAAAATTGC VIC-CAACATTTAGAAACCTTCT-MGBNFQ
Human
metapneumovirus B
Fusion GCYGTYAGCTTCAGTCAATTCAA (Common
with A)
GTTATCCCTGCATTGTCTGAAAACT VIC-CGCACAACATTTAGGAATCTTCT-MGBNFQ
Parainfluenza virus 1 HN GTGATTTAAACCCGGTAATTTCTCA CCTTGTTCCTGCAGCTATTACAGA FAM-ACCTATGACATCAACGAC-MGBNFQ
3 Parainfluenza virus 2 HN ATGAAAACCATTTACCTAAGTGATGGA CCTCCYGGTATRGCAGTGACTGAAC VIC-TCAATCGCAAAAGC-MGBNFQ
Parainfluenza virus 3 HN CCAGGGATATAYTAYAAAGGCAAAA CCGGGRCACCCAGTTGTG FAM-TGGRTGTTCAAGACCTCCATAYCCGAGAAA-
BHQ
Parainfluenza virus 4 Fusion CAGAYAACATCAATCGCCTTACAAA TGTACCTATGACTGCCCCAAARA CY5-CCMATCACAAGCTCAGAAATYCAAAGTCGT-
BHQ3A
4 Human coronavirus 229E Nucleocapsid CAGTCAAATGGGCTGATGCA AAAGGGCTATAAAGAGAATAAGGTATTCT FAM-CCCTGACGACCACGTTGTGGTTCA-
BHQ
Human coronavirus
OC43
Nucleocapsid CGATGAGGCTATTCCGACTAGGT CCTTCCTGAGCCTTCAATATAGTAACC CY5-TCCGCCTGGCACGGTACTCCCT- BHQ
Human coronavirus
NL63
1a gene ACGTACTTCTATTATGAAGCATGATATTAA AGCAGATCTAATGTTATACTTAAAACTACG VIC-ATTGCCAAGGCTCCTAAACGTACAGGTGTT-
TAMRA
5 Respiratory syncitial virus
A
NP AGATCAACTTCTGTCATCCAGCAA TTCTGCACATCATAATTAGGAG FAM-CACCATCCAACGGAGCACAGGAGAT-BHQ
Respiratory syncitial virus
B
NP AAGATGCAAATCATAAATTCACAGGA TGATATCCAGCATCTTTAAGTA FAM-TTTCCCTTCCTAACCTGGACATA-BHQ
Rhinovirus 5’-UTR TGGACAGGGTGTGAAGAGC CAAAGTAGTCGGTCCCATCC VIC-TCCTCCGGCCCCTGAATG-TAMRA
Adenovirus Matrix GCCACGGTGGGGTTTCTAAACTT GCCCCAGTGGTCTTACATGCACATC CY5-TGCACCAGACCCGGGCTCAGGTACTCCGA-
BHQ
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7All assays used the primers at a final concentration of
0.4 μMa n dt h ep r o b ea t0 . 2μMi na1 5μl reaction
volume. One-step rtRT-PCR was performed on 6 μlo f
RNA extract with the Platinum One-step qRT-PCR kit
(Invitrogen life technologies, Paisley, UK) on an ABI
Prism 7500 SDS real-time platform (Applied Biosys-
tems). The following thermal profile was used: a single
cycle of reverse transcription for 15 min at 50°C, 2 min
at 95°C for reverse transcriptase inactivation and DNA
polymerase activation followed by 40 amplification
cycles of 15 sec at 95°C and 34 secs at 60°C each
(annealing-extension step). Data acquisition occurred at
the annealing step of each cycle, and the threshold cycle
(Ct) for each sample was calculated by determining the
point at which the fluorescence exceeded the threshold
limit.
Statistical Analysis
The percentage detection rate for each pathogen was
analysed monthly, and for the overall study period.
Binomial 95% confidence intervals were also determined
for each detection rate. A chi-squared test was used for
any comparisons of two data sets.
Please note that ethical approval was not required for
this paper as the samples were collected as part of rou-
tine diagnostic work.
Results
Detection rate in all samples per month
Examination of the detection rate over the four-month
period shows that respiratory pathogens were detected in
27.9% of all samples submitted (95% confidence interval,
26.3-29.5%) (Table 4). Numerous pathogens were
detected in the samples. The most commonly detected
pathogen was rhinovirus which was detected in 8.9% of
all samples tested (95% confidence interval, 7.9-9.9%),
and was similarly detected in each of the months exam-
ined. Adenovirus was also commonly detected (3.5%
(95% confidence interval, 2.9-4.2%). Parainfluenza 3
showed its typical activity. It was detected in 7.9% of all
samples collected in April (95% confidence interval, 6-
10%) with decreasing activity thereafter (1.9% in July
(95% confidence interval, 1.2-2.8%))(p < 0.001)). Interest-
ingly, parainfluenza 1 (a pathogen normally associated
with winter activity) was present in an unexpectedly large
number of samples during this period (1.9% of all sam-
ples overall (95% confidence interval, 1.4-2.4%) and mir-
rored the increasing activity of H1N1/2009 (from 0.8% in
April (95% confidence interval, 0-2%) to 3% in July (95%
confidence interval, 2.1-4.1%) (p = 0.0054)). The detec-
tion rate for the remaining pathogens was low (< 1.6%)
and showed no particular pattern over the months
examined.
Discussion and conclusions
This study highlights the problems of using a clinical
algorithm to detect H1N1/2009 during a period of low
incidence. We found that clinicians frequently misdiag-
nosed common respiratory pathogens as H1N1/2009
during the spring/summer outbreak in Scotland. This
finding is similar to results found in a recent audit of
patients hospitalised with clinically diagnosed H1N1/
2009 in infectious disease units in Scotland [8].
The pathogens that were misdiagnosed as H1N1/2009
were, for the most part, those viruses expected to be
encountered during the spring/summer months.
Although all the pathogens included in the respiratory
screen were detected on at least one occasion, rhino-
virus was the most commonly detected pathogen. This
is not a surprising finding, since rhinovirus is detected
all the year round; moreover, it is recognised as a very
common cause of the common cold and is increasingly
being implicated in more severe clinical syndromes [9].
PF1, PF3, adenovirus and human metapneumovirus
were also frequently detected.
An unexpected finding was the frequent detection of
parainfluenza 1, a pathogen which is traditionally recog-
nised as a winter pathogen. However, our data shows
that there were numerous cases of parainfluenza 1 dur-
ing April-July 2009, and these mirrored the activity of
H1N1/2009. The unexpected summer activity of parain-
fluenza 1 mirrors that of parainfluenza 4 in 2008, which
was also unexpectedly detected during the summer
months (data not shown). This suggests that the epide-
miology of established viruses, such as parainfluenza 1,
should be re-examined in the light of new, more sensi-
tive, molecular assays.
It should be noted that the majority (~70%) of sam-
ples submitted to the laboratory were found to be nega-
tive by real time rtRT-PCR. By participation in various
EQA schemes, the assays used by the laboratory have
been shown to be highly sensitive. Consequently, the
large number of negative results are unlikely to have
been caused by the pathogens already tested for in the
screen. However, the respiratory screen does not include
an internal control. Consequently, false negatives due to
inhibition may have occurred. Nevertheless, the number
of samples affected is likely to be small, since a recent
in-house audit found that inhibition occurs in ~1% of
throat and nasal swabs submitted to our laboratory.
Poor sampling may also have led to false negative
results. However, as with the case of inhibition, the con-
tribution of this factor is likely to be minimal.
We cannot rule out that the possibility that these sam-
ples may have contained other respiratory pathogens not
currently included in the respiratory screen (e.g. boca,
HKU1 or bacterial respiratory pathogens). In future, the
Gunson and Carman BMC Infectious Diseases 2011, 11:192
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Page 5 of 7Table 4 Detection rate in all samples per month
April May June July Total
Number % (95% CI) Number % (95% CI) Number % (95% CI) Number % (95% CI) Number % (95% CI)
Influenza B 1 0.2 (0-0.92) 1 0.1 (0-0.7) 2
Influenza C 2 0.3 (0-1.2) 2
Parainfluenza 1 5 0.8 (0.-2) 2 0.3 (0-1.1) 18 2.3 (1-3.7) 37 3 (2.1-4.1) 62 1.9 (1.4-2.4)
Parainfluenza 2 0 1 0.1 (0-0.7) 4 0.3 (0-0.8) 5
Parainfluenza 3 48 7.9 (6-10) 42 6.5 (4.7-8.7) 21 2.7 (1.7-4.1) 23 1.9 (1.2-2.8) 134 4.1 (3.3-4.9)
Parainfluenza 4 0 3 0.4 (0-1.1) 3 0.2 (0-0.7) 6
Rhinovirus 64 10.6 (8.24-13.3) 52 8 (6-10.4) 58 7.5 (5.7-9.6) 114 9.3 (7.7-11) 288 8.9 (7.9-9.9)
Coronavirus 11 1.8 (0.9-3.2) 9 1.4 (0-2.6) 5 0.6 (0-1.5) 5 0.4 (0-0.1) 30 0.9 (0.6-1.3)
Adenovirus 14 2.3 (1.2-3.9) 25 3.9 (2.5-5.7) 24 3.1 (2-4.6) 50 4.1 (3-5.3) 113 3.5 (2.9-4.2)
Human metapenumovirus 6 1 (0.3-2.2) 15 2.3 (1.3-3.8) 17 2.2 (1-3.5) 15 1.2 (0.6-2) 53 1.6 (1.2-2.1)
Respiratory syncitial virus 21 3.5 (2.1-5.3) 2 0.3 (0-1) 1 0.1 (0-0.7) 2 0.2 (0-0.5) 26 0.8 (0-1.2)
M pneumoniae 2 0.3 (0-1.2) 3 0.4 (0-1.1) 1 0.1 (0-0.5) 6
Enterovirus 8 1.3 (0.6-2.6) 7 1.1 (0-2.2) 6 0.8 (0-1.6) 6 0.5 (0-1) 27 0.8 (0.5-1.2)
Mixed 20 3.3 (2-5) 9 1.4 (0.6-2.6) 21 2.7 (1.6-4.1) 28 2.3 (1.5-3.3) 78 2.4 (1.9-3)
Overall 202 33.4 (29.6-37.3) 168 26 (22.6-29.5) 198 25.6 (22.5-28.8) 337 27.5 (25-30.1) 905 27.9 (26.3-29.5)
Total 605 647 774 1226 3247
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7use of a larger testing panel either by further developing
the existing service or by using an alternative method
(e.g. microarray) would be useful to examine negative
samples. Another possibility is that other infective and
non-infective agents could have been present. For exam-
ple, the previously-mentioned audit of patients presenting
at infectious disease units found an alternative non-
respiratory diagnosis in ~40% of patients initially clinically
diagnosed as having H1N1/2009 [8]. Another explanation
could be that a number of samples were actually from the
worried well, or from asymptomatic contacts of known or
suspected cases of H1N1/2009. An audit similar to the
one outlined in the publication above [8] would help to
clarify this issue.
I ts h o u l db en o t e dt h a tt h es a m p l e se x a m i n e da r e
representative of our coding protocol and may not be
representative of the population at large. Consequently,
certain patient groups either with or at risk of severe
infection may be over-represented in the final data.
Whether or not this is the case, the present study shows
that numerous respiratory pathogens were being mis-
diagnosed as H1N1/2009. The misdiagnosis of H1N1/
2009 would have had many undesirable consequences.
For example, potentially serious conditions may have
been wrongly diagnosed as H1N1/2009 [8]. In addition
a large number of individuals are likely to have been
unnecessarily treated with oseltamivir [10]. This involves
unnecessary cost, and would also have exposed indivi-
duals to the side effects of oseltamivir [11]. It should
further be noted that there could well have been emo-
tional costs in being wrongly labelled as having “swine
flu”, especially at the early stage of the pandemic, when
the severity and outcome of the illness was still largely
unknown. In hospitalised patients, unnecessary infection
control procedures may have been implemented [10-12].
Disease surveillance may also have been inaccurate,
affecting public health measures and leading to
increased panic/concern in the general public.
One way to overcome these issues would be to incor-
porate a near-patient testing component into the algo-
rithm outlined above. This would no doubt reduce the
amount of unnecessary treatment and isolation, and
would ensure that surveillance data was more accurate.
Such a test would need to be very rapid, sensitive, and
specific. Although a number of methods have been
described, these can be expensive and - in comparison to
PCR-based methods - can be insensitive and non-specific
[13]. As a result, PCR methods may be required to inves-
tigate influenza negative samples and in low prevalence
periods, such as the time period examined in this study,
PCR may also be required to confirm positive results.
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